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The Japanese began their migration to the United States in the late 1900s to ease 
labor shortages in the agriculture industry.  The Japanese work ethic and productivity 
were valued initially, however upon arrival to the United States the Japanese migrants’ 
identity was confused with the Chinese.  As a result, they inherited the longstanding 
dislike of the Chinese by many native-born Americans, which was coined the “yellow 
peril”.  Any initial positive feelings toward the Japanese Americans dissolved once they 
showed their entrepreneurial potential and their desire to improve their economic 
conditions.  The desire to gain ownership of cultivatable land ignited anti-Asian 
sentiment and spawned a half-century of restrictive state and federal laws as well as the 
eventual internment of an entire group. 
Durring the decades before the Pearl Harbor attack, the equality and rights of the 
Japanese immigrants were challenged in many ways.   Once again the relocation and 
internment of Japanese Americans positioned them outside acceptable legal procedures 
and denied them many of the rights guaranteed by the constitution. As a way of 
concluding decades of ineffective restrictions, leaders took the established stereotypes, 
amplified them and effectively manipulated the identity of Japanese Americans. Shortly 
after the attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941 Japanese Americans were 
bombarded with accusations of sabotage.  Durring the months that followed the attack, 
propaganda images emerged, which depicted all Japanese as vermin-like creatures.  By 
February, national and West coast news declared that all persons of Japanese heritage 
belonged to an enemy race.  The Civilian Exclusion Orders were issued on March 31, 
1942: this marked the beginning of the relocation and interment process.  The Exclusion 
Orders were revoked in 1944.  The relocation and internment process was the 
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culmination of decades of infringing laws.  No matter the motivation, the pre-war racism 
and imprisonment of Japanese-Americans is a departure from America’s democratic 
ideals; it needs to be examined closely to acknowledge and mitigate future or current 
intolerance.  
 This paper will examine how prewar racism against Asian Americans created the 
desire to imprison an entire group of people.  The history of Asians in America will 
connect the relationship between racism and the economic success of an unwanted 
minority group.   Identifying the intent of the restrictions placed on Japanese Americans 
will illustrate how internment was the desired result of a gradual process to end the 
economic viability of Japanese Americans.  Answering the entire question of Japanese 
American success is not complete without knowing the factors which made the Japanese 
American communities so resilient to the social conditions of their new home.  The cause 
of interment was more than wartime anxiety.  Following racism and its source exposes a 
much shallower motivation for the interment; the cause was economic expediency, not 
military necessity. 
 The national census of 1940 estimated that 126,948 Japanese Americans lived in 
the Unitied States.  In all, Japanese Americans made up less than one tenth of one percent 
of the total United States population.1
                                               
1. Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps: North America Japanese in the United States and Canada During 
World War II (Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1981), 1. 
 Close to ninety percent of the Japanese Americans 
were isolated to the three west coast states of Washington, Oregon and California. The 
people who were born and immigrated to the United States were the first generation, or 
Issei. The second generation, born in the United States, is the Nisei.  The first generations 
of Japanese Americans achieved economic success because of the principles of their 
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native culture; but due to skin color their success was perceived as unfair competition, 
not the fulfillment of the American dream.    
 Prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the loyalty of the Japanese Americans was 
questioned by military and civilian leaders.  The Japanese Americans were referred to as 
a dangerous fifth column. An intelligence investigation ordered by Roosevelt in 1941 
called the Munson Report disagreed with the existing speculations, a passage from the 
report stated “There is no Japanese problem.” 2  This report found an incredible amount 
of loyalty to America and concluded that there would be no armed uprising of Japanese.  
The Munson Report validated its findings by exposing the limitations of the Japanese 
Americans.  The Japanese Americans were isolated to industries such as farming, and, in 
addition to their isolation, their physical appearance would not allow infiltration without 
going unnoticed. 3
The foundation for relocating the Japanese Americans was the perception of their 
disloyalty.  Yet in September of 1940 the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) 
called for the removal of the restrictions which prevented the entry of people of Japanese 
ancestry in to any branch of the armed service. A representative of the JACL stated, 
“American citizens of Japanese Ancestry are always ready and willing to do their 
utmost…”
  The report also recommended that the public’s attitude toward the 
Japanese Americans needed to be led in a positive direction.  
4
                                               
2 Michi Weglyn, Years of Infamy, (New York, Morrow Quill, 1976), 34 
 The JACL was attempting to open a venue for Japanese Americans to prove 
their loyalty.  The restrictions of service were not lifted until 1944, after approximately 
110,000 Japanese were living in interment camps. Despite the betrayal by the United 
States thousands of men and women volunteered for the army. The 442nd regiment, which 
3 Weglyn, 46. 
4 “Japanese Citizens Urge right to Fight for U.S.” Oregonian, September 3, 1940, pg. 7. 
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was comprised of only Nisei, has received more commendations than any fighting unit 
and suffered the most casualties in any of the American wars. 
 Initially the press circulated favorable stories about the Japanese American 
citizenry.  After approximately four weeks, the positive commentary was overwhelmed 
by accusation of sabotage. Leaders such as Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox stated, 
“…There was a considerable amount of evidence of subversive activity on the part of the 
Japanese prior to the attack.”5
The evacuation from the west coast began five months after the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor. Without a single verified case of sabotage, Japanese Americans were ordered to 
report to control stations.  In some circumstances only a four day notice to organize 
personal affairs was given.  The initial accusations of sabotage came from Hawaii, where 
it was claimed that Japanese residence of Hawaii blocked vital roads and rammed 
grounded planes with vehicles.  These reports were not officially denounced by the 
federal authority until three months after the attack.
  Knox denied Americans the specifics but reassured them 
that there was evidence. Unverified accusations from military and civilian leaders was 
part of a successful and deliberate attempt to manipulate public opinion. This 
environment allowed the relocation and internment of approximately 110,000 men 
women and children.    
6
                                               
5 Weglyn, 52 
  The possibility of a mainland 
Japanese invasion and the existence of Japanese planes and submarines were the type of 
rumors that circulated.  These types of stories skipped the verification process and went 
directly in to circulation.   An article by Edward Barnhart, explained,“The expulsion and 
incarceration of the Japanese began five months after Pearl Harbor, despite the complete 
6 Galen Fisher “Japanese Evacuation from the Pacific Coast,”  Far Eastern Survey 11 (1942): 146. 
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absence of any evidence of acts of espionage or sabotage by continental or Hawaiian 
Japanese, and continued after the Japanese fleet was decisively defeated in the Battle of 
Midway in June, 1942 and the possibility of an invasion of Hawaii or the main land 
eliminated.”7
Given the historical facts and the keeping in mind what officials knew at the time 
of the relocation it is easy to assume that their choices were motivated by something 
other than military necessity.  General John Dewitt who was in charge of western defense 
command, along with other leaders were able to frame the hysteria in their chosen 
context.  In DeWitt’s final report, he used military terms such as “deployed” and “at 
large” when describing how many Japanese people lived along the west coast.  This type 
of “word smithing” does not happen by accident.  A final example to affirm the lack of 
credibility amongst the leaders is available in a letter to Henry Stimson, from Dewitt; 
Dewitt states, “The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and 
confirming indication that such action will be taken.”
 With the fears of a mainland invasion gone and the reassurance provided by 
the Munson Report, internment based on military necessity should have eroded. 
8
More evidence of the blinded logic of the leaders is available in the1942 
Government Population Index.  The Index stated, “Military considerations cannot permit 
the risk of putting an unassimilated or partly assimilated people to an unpredictable test 
during an invasion by an army of their own race.”
 Lack of proof does not equate  
with proof, but the public was eager to blame someone for the Pearl Harbor attacks, and 
Japanese Americans fit the cast. 
9
                                               
7 Edward N. Barnhart “The Individual Exclusion of Japanese Americans in World War II,” The Pacific 
Historical Review 29 (1960): 111. 
 Lt. General John DeWitt, who was 
8 John Armor and Peter Wright, MANZANAR (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 44. 
9  Population Index, The Evacuations of the Japanese, July 1942, 166-168. 
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appointed as the Western Defense Commander, reacted to the Pearl Harbor attack by 
declaring the entire west coast of the United States and the southern portion of Arizona as 
a ‘strategic military zone.’  Within this zone Japanese Americans were forbidden.  After 
assessing all of the available sources of intelligence, Franklin Roosevelt signed executive 
order 9066, on February 19th 1941.  This order provided the authority to relocate and 
intern all Japanese Americans along the west coast.  The order also demonstrates how 
erroneous accusations were elevated above legitimate reports.  The executive order was 
delivered under the guise of military necessity, but the immediate outcome of significant 
financial loss to the Japanese Americans exposes the economic motivations.   Many of 
the Japanese American families had to sell all property that they could not carry to the 
camps.  In 1983 a commission was organized to establish a value of the total loss of 
property.  The commissions findings concluded that losses were, “...as high as $6.2 billon 
(in 1983 dollars).”10
The War Relocation Authority (WRA) was created in 1942 by Franklin 
Roosevelt. The WRA was in charge of the supervising the relocation process and the 
structure of camp life.  The WRA was also responsible for public relation matters, 
including making the camps appear habitable and full of happy citizens.  In truth the 
WRA hastily assembled the internment camps: at the Manzanar camp; the type of 
housing provided was approved for soldiers with survival skills and only as temporary 
solution.
 
11
                                               
10 John Armor and Peter Wright, Manzanar (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 81 
  This was not for civilian families with young and elderly.  People from a 
variety of professions worked for the WRA to monitor the camp environment.  
Sociologists, along with anthropologists, made observations of the Japanese Americans, 
11 Armor, 85. 
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as if they were examining a social experiment.  After the war, internment facilities were 
vacated as quickly as they had been filled.  After what seemed like a nightmare, the Issei 
and Nisei returned to civilian life. A significant number of people did not return to the 
west coast because there was nothing to which to return.  Their farms and businesses had 
been taken over by whites and a generational divide was created amongst a once 
homogenous group.      
 A concerted effort by the WRA ethnographers attempted to validate positive 
aspects of the interment process.  The ethnographers wrote of the internment process as a 
way to speedily acculturate an ethnic minority and a way of discontinuing the isolation of 
the “little Tokyos.”12
 Many authors have examined Japanese American history.  A majority of material 
available for Japanese Americans gravitates toward the relocation and internment 
process.  To support the economic factors involved with the racism towards Japanese 
Americans a larger timeframe needs to be examined.  Most primary and secondary 
sources offer a background of life before World War II: integrating the various sources 
provides a full scope of the economic, cultural and political factors.  Among the varying 
theses, there is a consensus that the internment was not out of military necessity but to 
accomplish other agendas. 
  Internment was quickly removed from public discourse, and for 
many years the internees did not speak of there experiences and how such a thing could 
happen in a country where people have certain inalienable rights.  
 Allan Bosworth, a former member of the United States Navy, suggests that the 
Japanese were subject to discrimination in association with the Chinese “Yellow Peril.”  
                                               
12  Orin Starn “Engineering Internment: Anthropologist and the War Relocation Authority,” American 
Ethnologist 13 (November 1986): 715.  
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As the Japanese migrants began to arrive in visible numbers throughout the 1880s, their 
economic success and reluctance to assimilate contributed to a groundswell of racism.13
 Offering a more in-depth examination of pre-war anti-Japanese racism is Roger 
Daniels.  Daniels suggests that if the California state government had not been restricted 
by the federal government, far more bills would have passed the state legislature, with 
design to limit economic opportunities for the Japanese Americans. 
 
The main focus of Bosworth’s work is to record the valiant efforts of the Japanese 
Americans who served during the Second World War and the internment camps; 
however, he does briefly discuss the early experiences of the Issei migrants in order to 
give the rest of his research context. 
14
 A second source by Daniels reviews the racism involved with the treatment of the 
Japanese Americans. The book, The Politics of Prejudice uses the discussions among 
political interests groups and elected officials to display the racial rhetoric.  Daniels puts 
the discussions in to context, but, for the most part, uses extended quotes.  The extended 
quotes, which allow people from the past to speak for themselves.  Stuart McClatchy 
delivered a speech to the Senate in 1924 that exemplifies the type of language used 
against the Japanese,“The Japanese are less assimilable and more dangerous as residence 
of this country than any other of the people s ineligible under our laws… They never 
  Even with the 
federal governments slight restrictions on the state legislature the Japanese Americans 
were deprived the rights of normal citizens, such as land ownership. Daniels has been one 
of the leading contributors to this theme. Over a long career he has written a volume of 
his own books and offers insight into many other researchers’ books.  
                                               
13 Allan R. Bosworth, America’s Concentration Camps (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1968), 23. 
14 Roger Daniels and Spencer c. Olin, Jr. Racism In  California: A Reader In The History of Oppression 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972) 116.  
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cease being Japanese.  In pursuit of their intent to colonize this country with that race 
they seek to secure land and to found large families.” 15
 The book Concentration Camps: North America, By Daniels includes 
details on Japanese migrants in Canada.  The Japanese were ill received in Canada 
as well as the United States. The Japanese Canadians successes in the fishing 
industry created the same economic resentment that was prevalent in the United 
States.  Canada also mirrored the United States in the removal of the Japanese, 
andCanada was responsible for the removal and relocation of approximately 
21,000 Japanese.
Quotes from people of all tiers of 
government are presented. Unfiltered quotes from policy makers reveal the conventional 
wisdom of the time. 
16
Patriotic societies along the west coast demanded and facilitated the 
various legal acts against Japanese migrants.  It can be argued that their intent was 
purely racial, but the real source of their hostility was economic competition.  In 
the tail end of the 19th century, the Japanese began to migrate to Hawaii and the 
west coast.  Author Yamato Ichihashi suggests that in many ways the Japanese 
inherited the anti Asian racism focused on the Chinese.  Opposition to the 
Japanese came in the form of vicious attacks from whites who occupied the same 
economic sector.  Campaigns that were started by labor parties who influenced 
the state government: “The attack was launched against the factory owner for 
employing Japanese in a manner offensive to the union… At any rate, the 
Japanese finding it impossible to remain in the factory because Chase (the factory 
  
                                               
15 Rodger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977), 99. 
16 Rodger Daniels, Concentration Camps: North America-Japanese in the United States and Canada 
During World War II. (Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co, 1981),175. 
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owner) failed to provide necessary protection for them, left it and sought work in 
families and on ranches. ”17
 “The peril from Chinese labor finds a similar danger in the unrestricted 
immigration of Japanese laborers.  The cheapness of that labor is likewise 
a menace to American labor, and a new treaty with Japan for such 
restriction, as well as the passage of laws by Congress, is desired for the 
Protection of Americans.”
 One example of white protectionism came from 
California Governor Henry T. Gage in 1901.  
18
The West Coast State officials submitted to the desires of unions and patriotic 
societies because of their own beliefs or were simply fearful of losing their next 
public election. 
  
The federal attempt to cripple the economic potential of the Japanese Americans 
was enacted in the form of the Immigration Act of 1924.  The new immigration law was 
backed up by what was, at the time, considered to be hard scientific facts.  Mae Ngai 
summarizes the act in one simple sentence, “The central theme of that process was a race-
based nativism, which favored the “Nordics” of northern and western Europe over the 
“undesirable races” of eastern and southern Europe.”19
Validating the necessity of the internment camps was not achieved by 
presenting legitimate facts, but rather by withholding intelligence.  Michi Weglyn 
examines the secret Munson Report, which was conducted in October and 
November of 1941.  Its findings dissolved any conceptions of disloyalty 
  The potential to assimilate into 
American culture was a matter of how white a people group appeared.  The scientific 
foundation for the law can only be classified as eugenics in present day terms. 
                                               
17Yamato Ichihashi,  Anti-Japanese Agitation, featured in  ed. Roger Daniels and Spencer Olin Jr. (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), 106. 
18 Ichihashi. 108. 
19 Mae M. Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the 
Immigration Act of 1924,” Journal of American History 86 (1999): 69.  
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surrounding the Japanese Americans.  Weglyn specifically identifies those who 
concealed this document before proceeding with the relocation and internment. 
“Evidence would indicate that the Munson report was shared only by the State, 
War and Navy departments; yet paradoxically Cornell Hull, Henry Stimson and 
Frank Knox, who headed up these Cabinet posts, were to end up being the most 
determined proponents of evacuation.”20
 The sources examining early Japanese migration experience, display the 
anti Japanese agitation with was fueled by economic factors.  The anti Japanese 
movement responded to their perceived threat by enacting restrictions on 
landownership and migration laws. The sources focusing on time surrounding the 
relocation continue with the prewar racism and describe how the internment 
occurred.  After assessing the statements that endorsed internment and the 
individuals who championed the military necessity stance, it is clear that their 
motivation was something other than national security.  Dewitt, Knox and other 
people in positions of authority did not present evidence to back their claims, 
instead they misused their positions to certify their statements. 
 Stimson prepared Roosevelt’s briefing, 
which included a copy of the Munson Report.  Stimson’s briefing stated how 
careful thought was given to Munson’s findings. Yet based on the outcome of 
Executive Order 9066, it does not seem logical to believe their deliberations 
included the Munson Report.    
Ronald Takaki includes details of what it meant to be a Japanese migrant 
and an American of Japanese heritage.  Takaki asserts that the adversity 
experienced by the Japanese migrants was motivated by racism and the origins of 
                                               
20. Weglyn, Years of Infamy, 34  
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the racism came from the desire to not compete economically with the Japanese.  
Also the ability to assimilate into American culture was used to quantify the 
accomplishments of an ethnic group.  Because of overt appearance differences, 
Japanese Americans could never fully assimilate.  Takaki illustrates this point by 
comparing the immigration of Armenians and how they were granted citizenship 
because they looked more Caucasian, yet the Japanese migrants were excluded 
from citizenship.  A local farmer of the Fresno California area laments over the 
situation, “The Armenians, they like the Japanese, lots speak only Armenian- just 
like Issei.  They came about the same time too.  But I think they learned a little bit 
more American and they look more like American and I think it helped them a 
lot.” 21
 The Japanese Americans who endured the relocation and internment offer 
the best explanations of why they were taken away and what the camps did to 
them as individuals and as a culture.  Monitoring the effects of camp life on the 
Japanese American culture is important because it was the one nonmaterial thing 
that could not be affected by restrictive legislation.  John Tateishi presents a large 
forum for people to express their memories of camp life.  Tateishi’s oral history 
book has thirty different accounts from men and women during the period of 
internment.  Tateishi’s book hints at the economic forces at work, “The fact is that 
  This example shows the vast disparity between the restrictions of an 
ethnic group based on appearance.  If an immigrant were successful while 
appearing white, it was called the American dream; however for the Japanese 
Americans success was called unfair competition.  
                                               
21. Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1990), 15.  
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the exclusion and incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II 
successfully accomplished what local pressure groups on the West Coast had been 
unable themselves to achieve for half a century.”22
 Monica Sone author of the book “Nisei Daughter” offers an inside perspective of 
life before the relocation began.  Sone describes the betrayal she felt throughout the 
relocation process and how she internalized accusations and began to believe in the guilt 
of her people.  Sone was a second generation Issei, and she describes the cultural divide 
between the Issei and Nisei generations that was created in the camp environment.  A 
Issei mother grieved over her sons decision to join the military, “Is this what we deserve 
from our children, after years and years of work and hardship for their sake? Ah, we’ve 
bred nothing but fools!  They can be insulted their parents insulted and still they 
volunteer. The Nisei never had backbones!”
  According to Tateishi, 
security had nothing to do with the actions taken against the Japanese Americans.  
Many of the individual accounts of camp life are full of frustration.  They lost 
opportunities when they were interned, those who were seeking educations were 
interrupted and as a result their internment, the course of their life changed. 
23
 An additional primary source, written by Mary Matsuda Gruenewald offers the 
clearest image of life before relocation. The concept of being excluded did not occur to 
Gruenewald prior to 1941, she recalls, “Dinner could include fried chicken and sushi. I 
always felt that I was Japanese American and I belonged in America, that I was part of a 
  Only the Nisei were allowed to volunteer 
for the military, civic positions within the camps were reserved for the Nisei as well.    
                                               
22 John Tateishi,  And Justice for All: An Oral History of the Japanese American Detention Camps (New 
York: Random House, 1984), xiv. 
23 Monica Sone, Nisei Daughter (Washington, University of Washington Press 1953), 201.   
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group.  Before December 7, 1941, it never occurred to me that I was not.”24 Gruenewald 
was a teenager when Executive Order # 9066 was issued.  Gruenewald recalls a 
conversation between her and her brother in the days that followed the Pearl Harbor 
Attack, “I wonder what will happen next…And what about us? Surely it will make a 
difference because we have been good citizens in our community, and Mary and I are 
Americans not Japanese.25
 In the decades before the 1940s, the following state and national laws were 
enacted to curtail the growth of the Japanese migrant population in the United States. The 
earliest was the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement, which ended the issuing of passports to 
Japanese labors.  Japanese migrants bypassed this law by traveling to either Canada or 
Mexico and continuing their migration from their. The next restrictive measures came at 
the state level. The alien land laws prohibited Japanese American migrants from owning 
land and limited the longevity of land leases to three years. The Issei were ineligible for 
citizenship because of their nation of origin.  The alien land laws were enacted by 
California in 1913, Oregon and Washington in 1923 and various other states along the 
way.  The Japanese skirted these laws by purchasing land in the names of their young 
children.  Restrictions on the longevity of leases also were poorly enforced because many 
of the large land holders wanted to retain their lucrative, hard working Japanese leasers.    
Masao Suzuki explained the 1924 Immigration Act “In 1922 the Supreme Court ruled 
 Gruenewald’s age allowed her to understand how the structure 
of camp life wedged the Issei and Nisei generations apart.   Like many other Nisei, 
Gruenewald and her brother volunteered for military service, despite the unfavorable 
treatment by their own country.  
                                               
24 Mary Matsuda Gruenewald, Looking Like the Enemy: My Story of Imprisonment in Japanese-American 
Internment Camps (Oregon: New Sage Press, 2005), 11. 
25Matsuda Gruenewald, 6. 
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that Japanese were ineligible for naturalization because they were neither white nor of 
African decent; and in 1924, the U.S. government passed a restrictive immigration law 
that included a clause excluding Japanese from immigration.”26
To comprehend the thought process of the relocation leaders it is important to 
consider the popular discourse of the Japanese Americans prior to Pearl Harbor.  Labor 
groups, such as The Native Sons of the Golden West, distributed materials that stated 
“Californian was given by God to a white people, and with God’s strength we want to 
keep it as he gave it to us.”
 The design of these 
restrictions was to stop the economic success of the Japanese American migrants, yet the 
implications of these laws focused on land and population. 
27
“We are anxious to have enacted an exclusion law which will effectively 
and permanently bar these little brown men from our shores.  Our 
objection to the Japanese in California is not, as you well know, based 
upon trivial or sentimental reasons.  We Object to them for economic 
reasons, we know Californians can not compete with them and maintain 
an American standard of living.” 
  A journal article by Paul Scharrenberg in 1921 accurately 
reveals the foundation of the anti-Japanese sentiment.  White labor organizer declared 
competition with the Japanese Americans as “evil.”  The various labor organizers lobbied 
their state representatives to enact regulations to further limit the economic viability of 
the Japanese.  A letter to a senator in 1921 from The California State Federation of Labor 
explained,  
28
 
 
                                               
26 Masao Suzuki, “Success Story? Japanese Immigrant Economic Achievement and the Return Migration, 
1920, 1930,” The Journal of Economic History 55, no.5 (1995): 891. 
27 John Armor and Peter Wright, 29.  
28 Paul Scharrenberg, “The Attitude of Organized Labor toward the Japanese,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 93 (January 1921):35. 
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The State Federation of Labor representative was able to include a racial statement inside 
his self-declared, non-trivial or racial statement, but he was able to identify the source of 
his racism within his statement as well.  
Using local and national newspapers in order to track the dissemination of 
information is useful.  Since the Japanese population was concentrated on the west coast, 
national news outlets such as The New York Times offered very limited coverage.  
However the Oregonian covered the local population of Japanese closely.  A critique of 
the press as a whole is provided by Gary Y. Okihiro and Julie Sly.  They examine the 
time frame of when negative stories began to circulate, along with the ramifications of 
the language and tone used by the press.  Okihiro and Sly are critical of the press and the 
roll they played in skillfully manipulating the public opinion. “The newspapers incited 
further racial violence by alleging espionage and sabotage.” 29
  In a 1921 article from the Oregonian, residents of Hood River, Oregon expressed 
their earnest feelings about what they called the Japanese question: “The problem in a 
large measure is a national one, but this part relating to land ownership is our own.”
 Okihiro and Sly view the 
press as a variation of a political pressure group who instigates crisis instead of 
moderating popular opinion. 
30
                                               
29 Gary Y. Okihiro and Julie Sly, “The Press, Japanese Americans, and the Concentration Camps,” Phylon 
44 (1983): 67. 
 
The steady increase of land ownership among Japanese immigrants created unwelcome 
competition for the white population.    The newspaper article depicts the anger of the 
non Japanese Oregonians in response to what they see as unfair competition. They are 
also welcoming the introduction of new restrictive measures at both a state and federal 
levels. 
30 “Anti-Japanese Sentiment is Strong in Hood River,” Oregonian, January 13, 1921, pg. 6. 
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 An article published in January 28, 1921 in the Oregonian involves an Idaho state 
legislative resolution. “By this resolution the legislature would call upon congress to deny 
further extension of the right of citizenship to Japanese, to exclude Japanese from 
immigration hereafter.”31
 The New York Times early coverage of the “Japanese question” also is an attempt 
to close the rift between Japan and the United States.  A 1924 article quotes a 
representative of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce.  The representative, Mr. Yamamoto, 
was understanding of the racial turmoil inside the United States and identified it as 
something America would have to confront internally.  Mr. Yamamoto made an assertive 
statement regarding future relations, “Japan favors peace, not because we are afraid of 
war, but because we hate war…we believe that security and rights can best be preserved 
by pursuing a policy of international accord rather than that of selfish aggression.”
 The Idaho residents felt the same vulnerability from the 
Japanese Americans and wanted binding resolutions to limit the viability of their 
socioeconomic growth.  Only three years later the United States Immigration act banned 
future immigration from Japan and other regions.  The criteria of who could immigrate to 
the United States after the immigration act were based on race; the ability to acculturate 
was determined by how Caucasian an immigrant appeared. The format of the early news 
papers featured small stories with the required “who, what and where”  Usually one quote 
from a participant was featured but the total length of the articles was little more than a 
few short paragraphs. 
32
                                               
31 “Idaho House Puts Curb on Japanese: Anti –Alien Resolution Adopted Decisively.”  Oregonian, January 
28, 1921, pg. 5. 
  As a 
nation Japan established itself as a force to be reckoned with, common territorial 
32 “Says Japanese Understand: Yamamoto Declares People Appreciate Our Stand and Want Peace.”  The 
New York Times,  April 16, 1924, 37:6.  
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interests, combined with the unfavorable treatment of the Japanese American migrants 
frustrated the Japanese who still lived In Japan.  These complex variables placed 
diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan on edge.      
A 1932 article by Thomas Bailey frames the motives around the Alien Land law.  
Bailey explains the rational of why national news outlets, such as The New York Times 
would not be as alarmed as the news outlets along the West Coast, “Of 27,000,000 acres 
of improved land in the state, the Japanese owned 12,726 acres in 1912… These few 
figures are eloquent, and they explain why Easterners were unable to understand the 
necessity for immediate and drastic action.”33
The 1913 California Land Law and similar acts, tried keep land out of the hands 
of the Japanese. Labor unions presumed farming would be impossible without land.  A 
mixture of lose enforcement and ways around the law enabled economic growth among 
the Japanese Americans, after the initial setbacks.  After the labor unions were no longer 
pacified by restrictions on land ownership their actions progressed.   The 1924 
Immigration Act banned all future immigration on the grounds that the Japanese were 
racially ineligible to citizenship based on the “national origins” theory.
 Given the amount of cultivatable land held 
by the Japanese Americans, the reaction to their presence was out of proportion, the 
people in the east thought the west coast was full of alarmist.    
34
                                               
33 Thomas A. Bailey, “California, Japan, and the Alien Land Legislation of 1913,” Pacific Historical 
Review 1 no. 1 (1932): 38. 
  At this point 
the Japanese Americans began to move into many other sectors other than agriculture, but 
a majority of the people remained in agriculture.  Within agriculture the Japanese 
Americans still managed to increase their profitability, even after land and immigration 
of new Japanese had been cut off. 
34 Ngai73. 
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The measures taken against the Japanese Americans had the intent of limiting the 
growth of their population and to constrain their economic development.  The restrictions 
placed on the Japanese Americans were less than effective compared those placed upon 
blacks in America after the Civil War; however the desired result was similar.  The 
restrictions were designed to prevent socioeconomic mobility; once the preconceived 
economic failure comes to fruition; it in turn vindicates the prejudice against the targeted 
minority group.  The Japanese were able to continue growth in spite of the immigration 
and land ownership restrictions because of their unique tightly-nit social communities 
and the values of their culture. 
 The Japanese American culture went unnoticed as being part of what made them 
successful.  Evaluating their culture is separate from assessing the early restrictions 
because their culture was not disrupted until the relocation and internment process. The 
Japanese immigrants were unlike other minority groups in the United States.  For 
instance, a profile of the Issei immigrants stated that a majority came from the agrarian 
middle class, where education was valued.35
                                               
35 George T. Endo and Connie Kubo Della-Piana, “Japanese Americans, Pluralism and the Model Minority 
Myth” Theory into Practice 20 (1981): 46 
  The Issei were also very good at organizing 
their labor and working collectively.  They were not as visible as other minority groups; 
they lived in concentrations of their own people, in part to avoid outside racism.  Within 
their communities poor behavior was suppressed internally by the use of gossip and 
cultural guilt.  Their system used labor bosses who would negotiate wages with white 
land owners.  The labor bosses also provided a social safety net for those people working 
for him.  The labor-boss system limited large scale interactions between the Issei and 
their adopted communities. 
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 Beginning as farm laborers, the Issei found economic traction within their culture 
structure. Upward mobility came relatively quickly in comparison to other minority 
groups. Within a few decades the Issei and their young Nisei children had diversified 
their earning capability and, to a degree, circumvented the land laws that restricted their 
mobility.  Three years before the 1913 Alien land Law, the Issei owned approximately 
15% of the land they worked. In 1914 the percentage of land owned dropped to 11%, yet 
by 1925 a full recovery was made and land owner ship grew to 35%.36  The Issei 
purchased land in the names of their children, who were United States citizens. “A single 
Nisei might technically own the farms of several relatives and closes friends.”37
A United States Works Projects Administration report in 1957 offered individual 
cases of the ingenuity and cooperation among the Japanese.  At the end of one story that 
transpired in 1905, the administration explained that, within a decade, the Japanese 
immigrants had inserted themselves into all tiers of the agriculture industry.  White 
growers were disgruntled because they were being out worked and undersold by the 
Japanese, the result of the white sentiment were urges to the state for more restrictions 
based on ethnicity and citizenship.
  Usually 
the land that was available for sale to the Japanese was third rate.  The Japanese 
ameliorated this problem by choosing high intensity specialty crops on these marginal 
lands, which allowed them to corner new markets of truck crops.   
38
                                               
36 Yamoto Ichihashi, Japanese in the United States (Stanford University Press, 1932),193. 
  John Hersey’s commentary in the book “Manzanar” 
gives value to the accomplishments of the Japanese Americans. “They had worked 
wonders in the soil.  They owned about one-fifteenth of the arable land in the three coast 
37 Robert M. Jiobu, “Ethnic Hegemony and the Japanese of California” American Sociological Review 53 
(June 1988) 359. 
38 U.S. Works Progress Administration Project, The Story of Japanese Farming in California, (University 
of California, no.7456), 24. 
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states, and what they had made of their farms is suggested by the fact that the average 
value per acre of all farms in the three states in 1940 was $37.94, while an acre on a Nisei 
farm was worth on average, $279.96.39
 The information in this paper supports the original thesis of  pre war racism and 
the relocation process as a product of economic forces.  The enduring racism was simply 
a derivative of economic competition from an unwanted people group.  The restrictions 
placed on the Japanese Americans were aimed at striping away the items needed for 
success.  The restrictions and their designers overlooked the actual source of Japanese 
American resiliency: their ability to overcome adversity resided within their culture.  
  High intensity specialty crops created this 
success.  White farmers practicing mono-crop agriculture were not as prosperous.   
The Japanese Americans found it more pleasant to live in tightly knit 
communities among other Japanese immigrants. Within this arrangement they enjoyed 
the stability of their social network and the profitably of their organized labor systems. In 
a large part the close-knit communities were formed in response to the long history of 
discrimination along the west coast.  To this point, federal and state governments 
restricted every tangible thing that created economic mobility for the Japanese 
Americans. The last thing left to take away were the aspects of their culture that promote 
economic successes.   
The design of camp life divided the Issei and Nisei, disrupting the traditional 
paternalistic culture and means of organization.  Because of the illogical decisions of 
General DeWitt and others, it is not rational to give them credit for having this result in 
mind.  The relocation centers were constructed so quickly that these effects were not 
likely premeditated on the part of the WRA.  Prior to relocation, the Japanese Americans 
                                               
39 John Armor and Peter Wright, Manzanar (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 6. 
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households were highly paternalistic; respect for their elders was also a foundation of 
their culture.  Each relocation camp was designed as pseudo democracy, which bared the 
Issei from participation in the civic matters.  As a result camp life removed the patriarchal 
control held by the Issei and turned over leadership to the Nisei.  Programs within the 
internment camps directed by the WRA, seemed arranged in such a fashion to facilitate 
the function of severing the family bonds within the Japanese American culture. A review 
of the WRA activities suggests that many of the Issei were so disillusioned about life 
outside of camp they wanted to permanently settle at the relocation facilities. This was 
due to the enculturation process which was unequally administered to the Issei.40
The autobiographies of the relocation and internment process support this 
concept. Many authors spoke of the wedge driven between the Issei and Nisei. Monica 
Sone’s recollection of a mother lamenting over her son’s decision to fight for the United 
States was a powerful display of the generational division as the deterioration of family 
unity. Similar to all of the restrictions of the past, the Japanese Americans recovered. The 
internment did not end the strong cultural structure that made the Japanese economically 
feared; the internment merely caused a disruption. 
  
Trying to question my own logic, in anticipation of counter arguments, I try to 
find weakness in the concept of the interment camps being used to break the strong 
culture bonds of the Japanese Americans.  None of the sources overtly stated this was the 
design, but it was the outcome. After the formation of the relocation camps the WRA 
attempted to frame the internment as a way to protect the Japanese from violence. This 
stance is not credible either, because it would be far more expedient to stop the 
                                               
40 Orin Starn “Engineering Internment: Anthropologist and the War Relocation Authority,” American 
Ethnologist 13 (November 1986): 715.  
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dissemination of false information that fueled hysteria. Instead the government took three 
months to address the first set of false accusations; by that point truth was just a matter of 
opinion.  The evidence that was at the disposal of Americas leaders stated a mainland 
attack was not possible after June of 1942, but they persisted with the policy of relocation 
out of military necessity. The outcome of this campaign instantly removed the Japanese 
Americans from economic competition.  All racism is born out of fear; the catalyst for the 
racism against the Japanese Americans was born from fear of the eventual economic 
superiority of a perceived lesser race. 
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